ABSTRACT With the rapid growth of sharing economy in China, the ridesourcing has greatly affected urban residents' travel. Based on the theoretical framework of the evolutionary game, this paper analyses the evolutionary game behavior between the Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) and passengers, and discusses the different evolutionarily stable strategies under the various conditions that the multistakeholders lie in. The theory and simulation results reveal the only evolutionarily stable strategy (strict management, honest behavior) will achieve, when the cost of strict management is less than the penalties of loose management for TNCs, and the cost of honesty is less than the penalties of dishonesty for passengers. Contrarily, when the government maintains the less regulation, the income of the loose management is greater than that of the strict management for the TNCs, which makes their initiative reduce. In addition, the behavior of dishonesty will be connived and grow. It turns out that the evolutionarily stable strategy may be (loose management, dishonest behavior). To achieve and maintain the perfect condition that TNCs take the strategy of strict management, while passengers take the strategy of honest behavior, it is necessary to improve and implement the mutual evaluation mechanism between the drivers and passengers, and impose a greater penalty on the loose TNCs. The results can guide stakeholders to make better decisions in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, along with the rapid development of the ''Internet plus'' era and great advancement of global information technology, the networked trend is sweeping the world. The sharing economy, represented by Airbnb, Uber and Didi, has greatly affected all aspects of human life, especially in the aspect of urban residents' travel [1] - [3] . In the tie of the sharing economy, the ridesourcing also comes into being in China [4] , [5] . The ridesourcing is defined as ''non-cruising booking taxi service'' by the Chinese Ministry of Transport. It builds a service platform based on Internet technology and accesses qualified vehicles and drivers through the integration of supply and demand information [6] . However, as a result of asymmetric information in the ridesourcing industry, the drivers and passengers can not accurately understand each other whether to fulfill the commission -agency contract, but also cannot know whether the TNCs will strictly manage them in accordance with the new policies, therefore, which will lead to the emergence of adverse selection and moral hazard and other issues. The cooperation game among stakeholders, such as passengers, drivers and TNCs and the traditional taxi industry, is difficult to achieve in reality. From the view of ridesourcing, it will seriously restrict the development and growth of the ridesourcing market. With the promulgation of new policies of ridesourcing and the brewing birth of industrial monopoly giants in China, it means that ridesourcing industry will face more administrative licensing and fewer subsidies [6] , while a new round of autonomous game among the stakeholders will be triggered. Consequently, in the context of the implementation of new policies, it is of great practical significance to study the evolutionary game relationship between the TNCs and passengers. The research will provide available decision-making support for the government to formulate the regulatory measures and strength. Finally, conclusions and suggestions are provided for the management of the ridesourcing industry.
From the beginning of the rise, the ridesourcing has received the widespread attention and controversy from the media and the public. As one of the hot issues in management for scholars, there have been quite a few discusses and researches about ridesourcing service [7] - [9] . However, most researches remains in the stage of qualitative description and reasoning, for lack of more detailed quantitative analysis and the feasibility explanation of operational measures about the ridesourcing regulation. Moreover, the research on the game relationship between the TNCs and the passengers involved in the ridesourcing market has not attracted enough attention. Hence, with the implementation of new policies and the brewing birth of industrial monopoly giants in China, whether the TNCs will strictly manage passengers, drivers and vehicles in accordance with the provisions, and whether the passengers will use ridesourcing service with honesty are what we care about.
For the TNCs, the strict management refers that they strictly review the passengers' breach of contract and malicious negative feedback, the drivers' operation qualification and breach of contract, and the vehicles' travel standard. The loose management refers to their inaction, the TNCs failing to manage the stakeholders involved in the ridesourcing market according to the new policies. On the other hand, for the passengers, the honest behavior means that they wait and take the ridesourcing by appointment, and seriously complete the travel evaluation by the mutual evaluation mechanism. The another dishonest behavior means that the passengers cancel the deal, and then take the cruising taxi or others without any reason, and provide feedback with little reference value.
Therefore, the TNCs and passengers both face dilemmas. For the TNCs, they should consider whether to indulge in loose management which will be penalized for neglect of duty and brings about negative externalities due to passengers' dishonesty, while the dilemma for passengers is whether to using the ridesourcing with dishonesty which may or may not be punished by the TNCs. This clearly resembles a game between the TNCs and passengers. They will adjust their strategies dynamically by observing and comparing payoff with others. The setting is provided for this paper in developing an evolutionary game model to deal with the dilemmas involved. Based on the theoretical framework of the evolutionary game [10] - [13] , the evolutionary game behaviors of TNCs and passengers are analyzed, and the evolutionarily stable strategies are discussed in this paper. How should the TNCs and passengers recognize and avoid their irrational behavior in the process of autonomous games? Which factors do affect the equilibrium and the stability in the two sides' game? At the same time, reasonable suggestion is provided for government to promote the ridesourcing market's healthy and sustainable development.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The background material on Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) is provided in Section II. Section III presents the analysis of the related work available on the ridesourcing services. In Section IV, the evolutionary game model is formulated to balance the conflicting relations between the TNCs and passengers. Moreover, the payoff matrix and the replicator dynamic system are presented to determine the evolutionarily stable strategy. The model is analyzed from a theoretical perspective in Section V. Simulation experiments are conducted to verify the evolutionarily stable strategy. In Section VI, The conclusions are in the last Section.
II. BACKGROUND: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY (EGT)
EGT is first developed by Fisher [14] in his attempt to describe the approximate equality of the sex ratio in mammals. Though he does not state it in special terms, it is the first way of equations that can be understood game theoretically nowadays. After him, Lewontin [15] explicitly applies EGT to biology for the first time in his book ''Evolution and the Theory of Games''. Later, based on above research, Smith and Price [16] put forward the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, which also makes EGT obtain huge development in various areas. Besides, the replicator equation, first introduced by Taylor and Jonker [17] , describes the evolution of the frequencies of population types taking into account their mutual influence on their fitness. This important property develops a connection between the evolutionarily stable strategies with Nash equilibrium. Since then, there has been an extraordinary rise of attention by economists and social scientists in EGT.
EGT is one of the most successful mathematical frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics [18] . As a methodology, the importance also gradually stands out in management. EGT has been widely used to study the dynamics of multi-stakeholders in many management scenarios [19] - [22] . In terms of the supply chain cooperation, Torres and García-Díaz [23] study the strategy evolution of the producer and the buyer by a formalism derived from the EGT. The results specify analytical conditions that favor the implementation of VMI on traditional chains without VMI. Yu et al. [24] apply the EGT to analyzing the intrinsic evolutionary mechanism of the VIM supply chains. The results show that the VIM model is favorable over the traditional chain structure, and the collaboration is critical for a successful, long-term implementation of VMI.
For technological adoption, Encarnação et al. [25] develop a theoretical model grounded on the strategic interactions from the different sectors (public, private and civil sector), to investigate the full adoption of EVs. Abass et al. [26] use the EGT to capture the long-term continuous behavior of the APTs on the cloud storage devices. The dynamical stability of each defense and attack strategy pair is studied according VOLUME 6, 2018 to the replicator dynamics criteria to characterize the locally asymptotically stable equilibrium strategies.
Considering the governmental supervision, Zhang et al. [27] developing an evolutionary game model between the inspector and the developer to deal with the dilemmas faced by the players. The logic and dilemma of land banking strategy and illegal land banking issues are analyzed by considering the replication dynamic mechanism and the evolutionary stable strategies under the various conditions that the players face. Liu et al. [28] describe the interactions between the stakeholders in China's coal mining safety inspection system by using the evolutionary game theory. The dynamic simulations are made to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to identify equilibrium solutions. Chen et al. [29] construct a reticular cooperative mechanism of MSW source separation for the Chinese government and explore the formation conditions of the interpersonal cooperative mechanism in the process of MSW source separation using the evolutionary game method.
However, there are few researches on the stakeholders' game behaviors in the ridesourcing market from a perspective of EGT. Most researches remain in the stage of qualitative description and reasoning, analyzing the interest demands [30] , behavior characteristics [31] , [32] and regulation rule [33] about the ridesourcing market. Although these researches provide methods and recommendations that can be used as reference for actually operational supervision, the practical measures need to be further proposed in the ridesourcing market. Besides, the researches of quantitative analysis are based on the evaluation system of traditional expected utility theory and the assumption of absolute rationality. Differently, the EGT doesn't require the game participants to be completely rational, which is in line with the actual decision-making among the stakeholders in the Chinese ridesourcing market.
In this work, specifically, EGT is used to model and analyze how the strategic choice of multiple stakeholders might change given different parameters such as the penalty cost and the reputation effect. In general, EGT provides tools and solution concepts for analyzing strategic choice situations in terms of expected payoffs [34] .
III. RELATED WORK
In the era of the sharing economy, the rise of ridesourcing services not only creates opportunities for the TNCs and drivers, but also brings great benefits to passengers and the entire society. However, the great development and popularity of ridesourcing also present the ridesourcing market with new operational problems for its stakeholders. Based on the operation mode and development track of the ridesourcing services, Hou [35] compares and analyzes regulatory routine of the ridesourcing among different countries such as Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom and France. Wirtz and Tang [36] reviews the development of Uber in America and its global expansion, in addition to analyzing the competition between Uber and Didi Chuxing in China. In some cities outside the U.S., such as Paris and Mexico, the ridesourcing services have been entirely banned [37] - [39] . de Souza Silva et al. [32] analyze the legal issues in individual transportation derived from the entrance of ride-hailing companies into the market, based on the Brazilian legislation.
The appearance of ridesourcing services has a great influence on urban traffic [40] , [41] . Zhen [2] conducts a survey in the Pittsburgh region to analyze urban residents' travel preferences and the view of transport planning when using the ridesourcing services. Rayle et al. [3] make a comparison of users' attitudes and travel habits among ridesourcing services, taxis, and transit by conducting intercept surveys in San Francisco. Dawes [42] uses a standardized questionnaire distributed across the United States to understand individual attitudes toward ridesourcing, and then, provide reasonable planning and recommendations for urban transportation policy. Contrerasa and Paz [43] conduct a multinomial linear regression analysis, by means of a multi-modal, time-series travel dataset, to estimate the effects of RHCs on taxicab ridership. Qian and Ukkusuri [44] build a Stackelberg game model among stakeholders to prove the existence of the equilibrium point in the ridesourcing market. Yan et al. [45] investigate traveler responses to a proposed integrated transit system, which considers integrating ridesourcing services with public transit.
The ridesourcing is very convenient for the public's travel and decreases their travel costs [3] , [30] . However, it brings about many security ricks and other problems [30] . Consequently, the supervision in the ridesourcing market is especially important. Schneider [46] points out that the cities such as Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago are responding to Uber as a threat to established taxi-livery services. The decades-old rules, regulations, and entrenched interests must be rethought and addressed by cities and governments. Flores and Rayle [33] present a case study of the regulatory response to ridesourcing in San Francisco, California, by reviewing publicly available documents and conducting interviews with related departments. Bengtsson [47] designs the experiments to verify the effectiveness of government supervision in the taxi market, and the experimental results indicate that effective supervision can improve economical efficiency and achieve Pareto improvement. Ridesourcing could constitute an integral component of a city's public transit and mobility network, if planners and regulators recognize its potential [48] , [49] .
IV. THE EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL BETWEEN THE TNCS AND PASSENGERS
With the legalization of the ridesourcing service in China, the more administrative license and less fewer subsidies is carried out in the ridesourcing industry. The TNCs are required to strictly manage the passengers, drivers and vehicles according to the new policies. It means that the TNCs' operational costs will increase. For the passengers, without the new policies, the honest behaviors are mainly affected by the implicit contract unique to the sharing economy. The implicit contract is defined as the agreement or behavior generally acknowledged and observed, including credit, reputation and other widely accepted standards and the consensus formed in the ridesourcing services [50] , [51] . A great number of researches have proved that these implicit contracts can effectively restrain the opportunistic behavior of cooperative subjects [52] - [54] . However, the lack of the TNCs' regulation and restriction on passengers makes the dishonest behaviors (breach of contract and malicious negative feedback and so on) still exist [50] . When the new policies are promulgated, the more supervision and restrictions are put forward for the TNCs, such as the introduction of regulatory rules in the local ridesourcing industry, mutual evaluation mechanism between the drivers and passengers, and customer's complaints mechanism and so on [6] . And then, the passengers and drivers have not yet enjoyed the sharing economy adequately and are pushed to the crossroads of going or staying.
A. THE MODEL
The TNCs and passengers are taken as game participants. Assuming that the TNCs have two strategies, termed here strict management and loose management. Let e 1 denote the strategy of strict management, e 2 denote the strategy of loose management. At the same time, the passengers also have two strategies, comprising the honest behavior and dishonest behavior. Let e 3 denote the strategy of honesty, and e 4 denote the strategy of dishonesty. Hence, the pure strategy for TNCs: S 1 = e 1 , e 2 = {strict management, loose management} and the pure strategy for passengers: S 2 = e 3 , e 4 = {honest behavior, dishonest behavior}.
In order to understand and analyze better the model, the reasonable assumptions are made about the TNCs and passengers.
Assumption 1: If the proportion of the strict TNCs is x, then the loose TNCs account for 1 − x. Also, when the proportion of honest passengers is y, the proportion of dishonest passengers is 1 − y.
Assumption 2: If the TNCs are engaged in strict management, it will involve a significant cost, in both effort and time, to afford. This cost is denoted as C 1 > 0. The loose management may lead to the damage of rights and interests for passengers and drivers, and the social loss of traffic congestion. The government will suspend the TNCs to undertake business, cancel the TNCs' registration and other punitive measures [6] . When the TNCs are neglect of duty, the penalization is C 1 > 0. The basic salary gained from the finish of travel deals for the TNCs is denoted by I 1 > 0, regardless of the strict management or loose management.
Assumption 3: When using the ridesourcing with honesty, the passengers will spend energy and time to wait for ridesourcing service, and pay the cost of altruism to benefit others by seriously completing the evaluation of drivers. The sum of these two types of cost is denoted by C 2 > 0. Altruism can be defined as behavior which benefits, either directly or indirectly, another organism, while being at a cost to the organism performing the behavior [55] , [56] . When the TNCs take strict management, the dishonest passengers will be fined by the TNCs. The passengers labeled as ''bad reviews'' by mutual evaluation mechanism will be confronted with the difficulty of taking a taxi. The penalty cost is denoted as L 2 > 0. The basic income for passengers is defined as the least utility that they satisfy their travel demand by ridesourcing service. The basic income is denoted by I 2 > 0.
Assumption 4: The normal accomplishment of the ridesourcing service makes vehicles effectively supplied and avoids waste of resources. Effective feedback from passengers can upgrade the service quality. The TNCs will obtain the income R 1 > 0, with passengers' honesty in the process of using ridesourcing. The strict management of the TNCs, which can maintain passengers' rights and interests, reduce security risks and improve passengers' travel satisfaction and service experience, increases the social welfare for passengers. The social welfare refers to R 2 > 0. The reputation effect for strict TNCs is R 1 > 0. when the TNCs are indolent, the passengers' dishonesty will bring about negative externalities L 1 > 0 for the TNCs, owing to the breach of contract and malicious negative feedback from passengers. The loose management may bring about the unsatisfied service and inconvenient travel for passengers. The loss of the passengers refers to L 2 > 0.
The payoff function is established between the TNCs and the passengers as shown in table 1.
B. SOLVING A PAYOFF MATRIX
Let f SM and f LM be the fitness payoffs of the TNCs who take different strategies (strict management or loose management, VOLUME 6, 2018 respectively):
Based on the above fitness payoff analysis, the average fitness payoff of TNCs is:
The replication dynamics equation of TNCs is:
Similarly, the fitness payoffs of the passengers with the different strategies (honesty or dishonesty, respectively) are f HP and f DP :
The average fitness payoff of the passengers is:
The replication dynamics equation of the passengers is: 
> 1, and
is not the internal equilibrium point. For the replicator dynamic system represented by equations (4) and (8) , the local equilibrium points of the system are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1, 1) .
To solve the partial derivative of F (x), F (y) with respect to x and y respectively, we get the Jacobean matrix J , as follows:
The determinant (det) and the eigenvalue (eig) of J are obtained. The stability analysis of the four local equilibrium points in scenario 1 is presented by Table 2 . The local equilibrium point O (0, 0) is the evolutionarily stable strategy. And the point B (1, 1) is unstable point. Furthermore, the point A (1, 0) and the point C (0, 1) are saddle points.
The passengers' loss due to dishonest behaviors is less than the cost of honest behaviors L 2 < C 2 . In addition, the TNCs' penalization for loose management is less than the cost of strict management C 1 + L 1 < C 1 − R 1 . Under these circumstances, the ratio of strict management and honest behaviors will gradually reduce to zero respectively. Namely, the TNCs will tend to choose the strategy of loose management, and the passengers are willing to choose the strategy of dishonesty. The final result is similar to prisoners' dilemma. The dynamically evolutionary process of the TNCs and passengers is reflected in Fig.1 .
In the process of the practical operation of the ridesourcing, initially, the government's constraints on the TNCs are not sufficient. The income of loose management is more than that of the strict management, which results in the ratio of strict TNCs reducing. Meanwhile, the passengers can obtain substantial gains by dishonest behaviors, when the TNCs turn a blind eye to the dishonest passengers, which encourages the passengers to choose the dishonest strategy. Fig.2 .
For the passengers, once their dishonest behavior is detected by the TNCs, the fined involved will increase the travel cost. However, since the cost of honesty is greater than the penalties of dishonesty for passengers C 2 > L 2 , then no matter what the proportion of strict TNCs or loose TNCs is, the passengers are generally willing to choose the dishonesty strategy. Under the circumstance, the proportion of honest passengers will gradually reduce to zero. The practical reason is that regulatory efforts and penalties on dishonest passengers are inadequate to stop dishonest behaviors.
On the other hand, when y >
, the proportion of honest passengers is great, which makes the income of strict TNCs yR 1 + I 1 − C 1 + R 1 is less than that of loose TNCs yR 1 + I 1 − L 1 + yL 1 − C 1 .Thus, the proportion of loose TNCs increases with the proportion of honest passengers decreasing. Until y <
, the income of strict TNCs yR 1 + I 1 − C 1 + R 1 becomes greater than that of loose TNCs yR 1 + I 1 − L 1 + yL 1 − C 1 , there are more TNCs to choose the strategy of strict management. That is to say, the proportion of strict TNCs will gradually increase to unity. The dynamical process means the rate of honest strategy makes a difference to the TNCs' strategy choice. The practice reason is that, once the rate of honest passengers is great, the cost of strict TNCs is greater than that of loose TNCs due to additional supervision cost for TNCs. It is difficult for TNCs to completely implement the supervision over the ridesourcing industry. Under this circumstance, the TNCs will have incentives for loose management. On the contrary, with the proportion of honest passengers gradually reducing to zero, the obviously reputation effect of strict management and the negative externalities of loose management make the TNCs' income difference. The income of strict TNCs is more than that of loose TNCs, Thus, the TNCs will eventually choose the strict management strategy. Fig.3 . With C 2 > L 2 , whether the management of TNCs for passengers is strict or loose, the evolutionarily stable strategy for the passengers is dishonesty. The reason is that, taking into account the imperfections of the mutual evaluation mechanism, the penalty for dishonest behavior is less than the travel cost involving time and energy. On the other hand, when L 1 + R 1 − C 1 + C 1 > L 1 , no matter where the passenger is, the reduced supervision cost and increased punishment for TNCs make the income of strict management greater than that of loose management. Then, the TNCs will have the incentives for strict management, which makes the proportion of strict TNCs gradually increase to unity. Under these circumstances, therefore, the rational passenger's best strategy is dishonesty, and the best strategy for TNCs is strict management. (1, 0) is unstable point. The point C (0, 1) and the point B (1, 1) are saddle points.The dynamically evolutionary process of TNCs and passengers is reflected in Fig.4 .
B. WHEN THE COSTS INCURRED BY HONEST PASSENGER IS LESS THAN THE LOSS OF DISHONEST PASSENGER
With L 1 + R 1 − C 1 + C 1 < 0, the cost of strict management is greater than the penalties of loose management for TNCs C 1 − R 1 > C 1 + L 1 . Thus, the ratio of the TNCs choosing the strict management will continuously reduce to zero. For the passengers, when the cost of honesty is less than the penalties of dishonesty C 2 < L 2 , the passenger's evolutionary process relies on the ratio of TNCs' strict management and loose management. That is,
, the proportion of strict management for TNCs is great. Under the circumstance, the income of honest passengers (xR 2 + I 2 − C 2 − L 2 + xL 2 ) is greater than that of dishonest passengers xR 2 − xL 2 + I 2 − L 2 + xL 2 . It turns out that the passengers are more inclined to choose the honesty strategy, and the ratio of honest passengers will 
, the proportion of strict management for TNCs is less, which will eventually result in dishonesty for passengers due to opportunistic tendencies.
In reality, the government regulation and the supervision cost of the TNCs are critical factors that affect the TNCs' behavior. With the small regulation and high supervision cost imposed, the cost of strict management is greater than the penalties of loose management for TNCs. The rational TNCs' best strategy is to make loose management. Under this circumstance, the TNCs are generally not willing to try their best to supervise the ridesourcing industry. The TNCs' neglect of duty and the passengers' opportunistic tendency cause the passengers will choose the dishonest strategy for pursuing greater income.
Scenario 5: when C 2 < L 2 , and 0 1] , and y 0 ∈ [0, 1], the internal equilibrium point (x 0 , y 0 ) exists. The local equilibrium points of the system are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) and Table 3 presents the stability analysis of the five local equilibrium points in scenario 5. The evolutionarily stable strategy doesn't exist. The local equilibrium point O (0, 0), A (1, 0) , B (1, 1) and C (0, 1) are saddle points. The point D (x 0 , y 0 ) is the central point. The dynamically evolutionary process of the TNCs and passengers is presented in Fig.5 .
With C 2 < L 2 , and 0 < L 1 + R 1 − C 1 + C 1 < L 1 , we take the position I of the system as initial state to illustrate the dynamically evolutionary process in fig.5 . From I, we can get x < x 0 and y > y 0 . When the proportion of honest passengers is high (y > y 0 ), the income of strict TNCs yR 1 + I 1 − C 1 + R 1 is less than that of loose TNCs yR 1 + I 1 − L 1 + yL 1 − C 1 . Thus, the proportion of loose TNCs increases. Simultaneously, when the proportion of strict TNCs is low (x < x 0 ), the income of the honest passengers (xR 2 + I 2 − C 2 − L 2 + xL 2 ) is less than that of the dishonest passengers xR 2 − xL 2 + I 2 − L 2 + xL 2 . The proportion of dishonest passengers also increases. Until y = y 0 , still x < x 0 .when x < x 0 , the income of the honest passengers is still less than that of the dishonest passengers. The proportion of dishonest passengers continues to rise. The position of system enters II.
From II, x < x 0 , the proportion of dishonest passengers continues up. But y < y 0 , the income of the strict TNCs is greater than that of the loose TNCs. The proportion of strict TNCs will increase. Until x = x 0 , here y < y 0 , the proportion of strict TNCs continues up. The position of system enters III.
III and IV are respectively symmetrical with I and II. In III, based on the similar reason, the proportion of strict TNCs and honest passengers gradually rises. Until y = y 0 , in IV, The proportion of strict TNCs is down, and the proportion of honest passengers is up. Later, the position of system returns to I again. The dynamically evolutionary process repeats in such a way, eventually developing a limit cycle with the central point D through the initial value.
Considering the complexity and uncertainty in the actual decision-making of ridesourcing service, the TNCs will dynamically adjust the management strategy combining multiple factors, such as their supervision cost, the proportion of dishonest passengers and illegal drivers, the strength of government regulation, and the reputation effects, etc. Immature ridesourcing market and new policies make the TNCs' management fluctuant and unstable. It turns out that the passengers also will adjust their strategy to choose honesty or dishonesty according to the strategy change of the other side. Table 3 presents the stability analysis of the four local equilibrium points in scenario 5. The local equilibrium point B (1, 1) is the evolutionarily stable strategy. The point C (0, 1) is unstable point. The point O (0, 0) and the point A (1, 0) are saddle points.The dynamically evolutionary process of TNCs and passengers is reflected in Fig.6 . With L 1 + R 1 − C 1 + C 1 > L 1 , the income of strict management is greater than that of loose management for TNCs. The proportion of strict TNCs will gradually increase to unity. For passengers, with x < x 0 , the proportion of loose TNCs is high. The passengers will have a tendency towards dishonesty for lack of strict management. Thus, the ratio of honest passengers will gradually reduce. Until x > x 0 , most TNCs choose the strict management. With C 2 < L 2 , the passengers will adopt honest strategy to avoid affording huge penalties due to dishonest behavior. The proportion of honest passengers also will gradually increase to unity. This means that the TNCs will eventually choose the strategy of strict management, and the passengers will choose the strategy of honesty, which is what we expected.
According to the above analysis, when the income of strict management is greater than that of loose management for the TNCs, and when the cost of honesty is less than the penalties of dishonesty for passengers, the evolutionary strategies for the TNCs and passengers are strict management and honesty respectively. The reason is that, with the new policies carried out and put into practice step by step, more and more TNCs start to make strict management in the ridesourcing market for getting government support and expanding market share. Under this circumstance, the passengers will eventually choose honesty strategy for avoiding the penalization from strict TNCs.
VI. THE SIMULATIONS
Although the theoretical results have been analyzed in section V, to deepen understanding, a simulation of the game model is conducted to further clarify the meaning of the model [57] - [59] . The main objective of this section is to observe the dynamical route of evolutionary game and cooperation tendency between TNCs and passengers by setting different initial probabilities under the initial situation from scenario 1 to scenario 6: x x 1 = 0.8, y 1 = 0.2; y x 2 = 0.6, y 2 = 0.4; z x 3 = 0.2, y 3 = 0.6; { x 4 = 0.1, y 4 = 0.1.
Considering different probabilities under the initial conditions, the dynamical route of evolutionary game between TNCs and passengers is presented in Fig. 7 . The simulation results show the only evolutionarily stable strategy is (0, 0).
In reality, in the beginning of the promulgation of the new policies about ridesourcing in China, the government regulation over TNCs is in the groping stage, and not effectively put into practice. Excessive management costs make the TNCs turn a blind eye to passengers' dishonest behavior, which leads to dishonest behavior prevailing. From the perspective of the ridesourcing industry, this situation is extremely unreasonable for ridesourcing service's healthy and sustainable development.
The dynamical route of evolutionary game between TNCs and passengers is presented under the initial conditions for different probabilities in Fig. 8 . The simulation results show the only evolutionarily stable strategy is (1, 0) .
The dynamical route of evolutionary game between TNCs and passengers is presented under the initial conditions for different probabilities in Fig. 9 . The evolutionarily stable strategy (1, 0) is as same as that of the Algorithm 2.
The practical reason for Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 is that the gradual implementation of the new policies extremely reduces strict management costs for TNCs, and imposes punishment on loose TNCs. However, the inadequate penalty for the dishonest passengers makes the passengers have the incentives to adopt dishonest strategy. Under these circumstances, the evolutionarily stable strategy between the TNCs and passengers will converges (1, 0).
With different probabilities under the initial conditions, the dynamical route of evolutionary game between TNCs and passengers is presented in Fig. 10 . The simulation results show the only evolutionarily stable strategy is (0, 0).
Since the cost of strict management is greater than the penalty of loose management, there is less prospect of the strict management. The final evolutionarily stable strategy of the TNCs is to carry out loose management. Besides, although the cost of honesty is less than the penalty of dishonesty, the passengers will choose dishonesty due to TNCs' loose management, and obtain more gains by dishonesty behaviors. It turns out that the evolutionarily stable strategy between the TNCs and passengers will converge (0, 0). 
Algorithm 5: when C
Under the initial conditions for different probabilities, the dynamical route of evolutionary game between TNCs and passengers is presented in Fig. 11 . The simulation results show the evolutionarily stable strategy doesn't exist.
Namely, the strategies of the TNCs and passengers are changeable with the change of market circumstances. That is, when the strict TNCs are more, the passengers will restrain their dishonest behaviors, while the TNCs dynamically adjust the strictness of their management according to the ratio of honest passengers. Immature ridesourcing market and new policies are unable to always keep the TNCs' strict management, in turn, which also cause the passengers' dishonest behaviors. This is in line with the dynamics of the real world that exists today.
Under the initial conditions for different probabilities, the dynamical route of evolutionary game between TNCs and passengers is presented in Fig. 12 . The simulation results show the only evolutionarily stable strategy is (1, 1), and (1, 1) is what we expected.
With the new policies carried out and put into practice step by step, the TNCs are faced up with more stringent constraints and supervision, and passengers' dishonest behaviors will make an adverse difference to the personal credit. Under these circumstances, the TNCs accept the strategy of strict management, while passengers accept the strategy of honesty, which is in agreement with the requirements of healthy and sustainable development for ridesourcing industry.
From the above simulation results, three major implications can be summarized.
1) The simulation results above indicate that the TNCs and passengers can coordinate their conflicts to promote the ridesourcing industry's stable and sustainable development. Stakeholders can influence each other's behavior, which can change the changeable and complicated environment of the whole travel market. In practice, an increasing number of management measures have been carried out to respond to the possible issues involved in the ridesourcing market, for instance, the mutual evaluation mechanism between the drivers and passengers, complaint mechanism, onebutton alarm mechanism, etc. 2) Based on the results of the simulation, the application of the evolutionary game model developed indicates the need for strengthened control and penalization on illegal behaviors among stakeholders, and here refers to passengers' dishonesty behavior. Moreover, a powerful and practicable deterrent system should be provided. These will help prevent dishonesty strategy by passengers.
3) The government support and guidance are key factors for the TNCs' strict management in the long run. As stated earlier, the excessive management costs make the TNCs turn a blind eye to illegal behaviors in the ridesourcing industry, such as the breach of contract between the drivers and passengers, malicious negative feedback, and the drivers' operation qualification, etc. Thus, building a healthy travel market eagerly necessitate an effective means of regulation. The government can help by furthering the support and guidance of the strict TNCs. In the meanwhile, the greater penalty should be imposed on the loose TNCs.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Supporting and guiding the development of the sharing economy enable greater efficiency in the use of resources and bring greater convenience to our people in China. As a typical representative of urban traffic in the field of sharing economy, the development of the ridesourcing has aroused extensive concern of the governments and scholars. The autonomous game among the stakeholders is worth studying to analyze the ridesourcing industry and provide practical suggestions for the operation and supervision in ridesourcing management. The ridesourcing industry is a typical two-sided market. The market has formed the commercial ecosystem where the TNCs act as an intermediary, connecting drivers and passengers. These stakeholders are interdependent and interact with each other. In the ridesourcing industry, asymmetric information exists between drivers and passengers due to the special nature of virtual trading environment and trading behavior hidden, which makes it is often the case that the dishonest behaviors occurs to drivers and passengers. Therefore, the ridesourcing service necessitates the TNCs' supervision. Obviously, there must be regulatory costs and the possibility of capturing behavior [60] - [62] in the ridesourcing market. The appearance of the TNCs' loose management will have a negative influence on the industry's healthy and sustainable development.
Based on the theoretical framework of evolutionary game model, theoretical research and simulation experiments show that, when the income of strict management is greater than that of loose management for TNCs, and when the cost of honesty is less than the penalty of dishonesty for passengers, the only evolutionarily stable strategy is (strict management, dishonest behavior). The equilibrium result is what we expect. The incentive effect of reputation and the punishment effect of the supervisory mechanism can mitigate and evade the double default between the passengers and drivers, and the loose management behaviors by the TNCs. The major factors influencing the actions of the TNCs are the operational costs, the government's support, the penalization for loose management and the negative externalities. It is shown that, when the TNCs' loss for loose management is less than the cost of strict management, the TNCs will choose the strategy of loose management. According to the behavioral decision theory, everyone really wants to maximize his or her own earnings. When there is little or no constraint on passengers, the loose management of the TNCs encourages the passengers to choose the strategy of dishonesty for more revenue. Consequently, the bounded rational passengers will eventually choose the dishonest behaviors, no matter how severe the penalty for dishonesty is.
For another, with the promulgation of the new policies and the legalization of the ridesourcing, relevant provisions of the ridesourcing around China have gradually formed. From the conditions examined here, the need for government regulation and the TNCs' strict management is greatly critical in dealing with illegal issues among stakeholders in the ridesourcing market. To achieve and maintain the perfect condition that the TNCs take the strategy of strict management, while passengers take the strategy of honesty behavior, the strategy of (loose management, dishonest behavior) should be identified. Simultaneously, it is necessary to impose a greater penalty on loose TNCs and dishonest passengers, and take appropriate compensation measures for strict TNCs.
In today's increasingly complex and highly competitive ridesourcing market, cooperative game relationship between the TNCs and the passengers is great important. In this paper, a novel evolutionary game model of the TNCs and passengers is proposed to further explore their dynamic evolution process under different conditions, and the corresponding evolutionarily stable strategy is got. There are more distinctive features and novelty in the selection of ideas that the evolutionary game behavior between the TNCs and passengers is analyzed. Moreover, the numerical simulations are conducted to prove the validity of the theoretical results. The theory and simulation results indicate that the ridesourcing industry can form the perfect pattern of the TNCs' strict management and the passengers' honesty. This study can help TNCs and passengers to develop the long run cooperation. There are some limited aspects that should be investigated in the future work, such as the tripartite evolution game about the TNCs, drivers and passengers.
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